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1. Introduction  
The taxation of income from intellectual property (IP) has received considerable research interest 
in recent years. Much of this interest has been stirred by new tax legislation and the political debate 
connected to it. In the last twenty years, many countries have moved to schedular taxation by 
introducing a special tax rate on intellectual property income that is below the standard corporate 
tax rate. Schemes that introduce such a schedularization of business taxation have been labelled as 
patent boxes, innovation boxes, IP boxes, or IP regimes (OECD, 2015; OECD, 2017). 
Intangible assets are increasingly perceived to be important value-drivers within multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). From the perspective of an MNE, locating these assets in low-tax affiliates is 
an attractive tax-saving strategy. There is a large body of literature, more extensively reviewed in 
the next section, that indicates that IP boxes and taxes on income from intellectual property affect 
the location of patents. For example, Griffith et al. (2014) and Alstadsæter et al. (2018) provide 
evidence that a lower tax on IP income increases the number of patents that are registered in the 
respective jurisdiction.  
While there is ample evidence that low tax rates attract the location of patents, empirical evidence 
on the effects of taxes on the location of actual research and development (R&D) activity is all but 
missing. An exception is Alstadsæter et al. (2018) who find that the tax advantage of IP boxes in a 
panel sample of large research-intensive multinationals is negatively rather than positively 
correlated with a variable designed to measure the shift of inventors to IP box countries.  
One difficulty of identifying tax effects on the location of R&D activity is that country-level data 
on R&D expenditures of multinational companies is scarce. Most existing studies on IP boxes 
work with patent registration data. At the same time, the location of patent registration provides 
limited evidence on where the actual R&D activities take place and, in particular, on the size of 
local R&D expenditures. When it comes to patent registration data, evidence on the distinction of 
patent registration and the location of real R&D activity can only be derived from a gap between 
the country of registration and the residence country of the inventor. This leaves a potentially 
important research gap since the technological spillover effects of foreign direct investment and 
foreign know-how are expected to result from the size of real research activity, not so much from 
the mere registration of patents or the residence of single individuals. Within an MNE, the 
registration of patents may be influenced by the wish to shift profit into low-tax jurisdictions, 
without much connection to the location of research activity.  
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While corporate groups report aggregate R&D expenditures, the distribution across different 
subsidiaries is difficult to obtain in data bases that are readily available for researchers. The present 
paper adds empirical evidence on real R&D activity by looking at R&D expenditures of U.S. 
majority-owned subsidiaries abroad, data that is available on the country-year level from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  
Our empirical analysis is guided by a model of optimal R&D decisions. Within our model MNE, 
the benefits of R&D derive from royalty income and from increased productivity of the MNE as 
a whole. Since the increased productivity is not confined to the subsidiary that undertakes the 
R&D, research expenditures contribute towards a public good within the MNE.1 This can have 
interesting and counter-intuitive implications for the role of corporate taxes if one country 
exogenously increases its corporate tax. An increase in the corporate tax of one country means 
that the value of the cost deductibility of R&D expenditures increases in this country. At the same 
time, due to the public goods characteristics, the additional benefits of a marginal unit of R&D 
occurs in other countries as well. As the tax rates of these other countries are constant, the average 
tax rate on R&D benefits across subsidiaries increases by less than the tax rate for the deduction 
of R&D expenditures. As a result, a corporate tax increase can increase local R&D of foreign 
subsidiaries. This cost shifting is a tax efficient reaction if, as it is assumed in the model, the 
subsidiary that increases its R&D costs reports positive taxable profits, which implies that transfer 
pricing strategies and other strategies of tax avoidance are insufficient to wipe out all taxable 
profits.  Thus, in our study, we propound the possibly counter-intuitive idea that a higher statutory 
corporate income tax rate may have positive effects on the local R&D expenditures by MNEs.  
The positive effect of the corporate tax on R&D expenditures may even be amplified by the 
existence of an IP regime. In this case, if the R&D in the tax-reform country increases, not only 
the profitability gains of affiliated subsidiaries in other countries are sheltered from the corporate 
tax increase. In addition, the IP regime allows to spare from the tax rise qualified IP income in the 
country that introduces the corporate tax increase.  
A priory, the role of IP regime for the way in which the corporate tax rate affects R&D 
expenditures, however, is not unambiguous. While it is true that a lower IP tax rate leaves more of 
the benefits of R&D to an innovating firm, the existence of an IP box may also reduce the tax rate 
 
1 Recent evidence that corporate R&D leads to productivity gains in other parts of a multinational is provided by Bilir and Morales 
(2020). The idea that knowledge is shared across locations within the firm dates back at least to Arrow (1975) and is consistent with 
recent studies emphasizing the transfer of intangible inputs within firm boundaries as a key motive for plant integration (Atalay et al., 
2014). 
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applicable when a subsidiary deducts its R&D expenditures. De jure, most international IP regimes 
are following the net income approach. In a net income approach, the preferential IP rate applies 
not only to the revenues earned on the IP. It should also be applied when deducting the cost 
incurred to produce the IP. If this approach is followed through, an increase in the headline 
corporate tax rate may not increase the value of the cost deductibility of R&D expenditures and 
their overall size. In practice, however, it should be difficult to tell apart all those cost from normal 
business expenses. In this case, for tax purposes, firms have a strong incentive to declare that 
facilities and most of the personnel are used for non-R&D related purposes.  
A further reason why an IP box may not prevent that R&D expenditures are deducted against the 
standard corporate tax rate changes is the application of the gross income approach: a few 
countries officially allow all R&D costs to be deductible at the higher standard rate, while IP 
revenues still benefit from the preferential IP rate.  
In the end, the question of whether an increase in the corporate tax rate has a higher or lower 
R&D effect in countries with an IP box is an empirical one. Our empirical analysis of R&D by 
U.S.-owned MNEs shows that the headline corporate tax has a positive, though insignificant, 
effect on R&D if there is no IP regime. The effect of a corporate tax increase on R&D 
expenditures is larger and significant in IP regime countries. This is compatible with the 
expectation that tax incentives are active and a large share of R&D deductions for tax purposes is 
channeled into the standard basket of deductions. We find no significant differences of corporate 
tax changes depending on whether an IP regime uses the gross or a net income approach.  
The empirical result that a higher corporate tax rate tends to have a positive effect on R&D 
expenditures may not only come as a surprise to many policy makers, but, as to our best 
knowledge, is new to the literature on taxes and R&D.  
When it comes to the effect of an IP regime, we find that given an IP regime is in place, a lower 
preferential rate on IP income significantly increases R&D expenditures. This suggests a positive 
effect of the tax preference on the attractiveness for R&D, while Alstadsæter et al. (2018, p. 165) 
found that, in their sample, the size of the tax advantage of patent boxes led to a surprising negative 
effect on the probability of moving inventors to the patent box country. At the same time, in our 
study, the introduction of an IP regime has only a small effect on R&D.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of previous studies 
that look at how taxes affect the international location of patents. Section 3 introduces a simple 
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model of an MNE’s R&D decisions. Section 4 presents our data, Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results derived from U.S. MNE expenditures. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Literature review  
Evers et al., (2015) and Bradley et al., (2015) review several objectives that may motivate 
governments’ decisions to introduce Intellectual Property regimes.3  Both papers suggest that 
governments that introduce IP regimes aim to reduce tax base erosion, which occurs when IP is 
shifted to tax havens or other tax law jurisdictions.  
Against the background of  our own study, the main interest is in existing papers that evaluate the 
link between taxes, IP regimes and the amount and location of  R&D output.  
Most prior studies have measured R&D output in terms of  patents and suggest that low and 
preferential tax rates on IP income lead to more local R&D output. At the same time, the tax 
induced increase in patent applications seems associated with a significant increase of  the share of  
patents whose inventors are located abroad. This leaves open whether an IP regime is able to 
attract also the underlying R&D activity.  
Ernst and Spengel (2011) estimate that a decrease of the corporate income tax rate increases the 
average count of patent applications, the effect being 120% larger for inventions developed by 
foreign inventors. Griffith et al. (2011) and Griffith et al., (2014) confirm that lowering a country’s 
corporate tax increases the probability that a patent is registered for a firm in that jurisdiction. In 
addition, Griffith et al. (2011) document that the introduction of IP regimes in Benelux countries 
increased newly created patents in Benelux countries, but a fall elsewhere. Bradley et al., (2015) 
suggest a roughly 3% increase in new patent applications for every one percentage point decrease 
in the tax rate on patent income. Unlike in Griffith et al. (2011), this effect appears to be confined 
to patents for which the inventors and patent owners are located in the same host country; there 
seemed no measurable impact on the number of patents owned and invented in different 
countries. Evers et al. (2015), Klemens (2016) and Liberini et al. (2018) provide further evidence 
that preferential tax rate regimes on IP income distort patent registration and lure income on 
intellectual property to countries that, apart from the IP regimes, are not necessarily perceived as 
low-tax countries. 
 
3 Other objectives that may motivate governments’ decisions to introduce Intellectual Property regimes might be: to foster domestic 
innovation and the creation of high-value jobs; to incentivize firms to increase investment in innovative activities; to attract or retain 
mobile investments that may be associated with high-skilled jobs and knowledge creation (Evers et al., 2015; Bradley et al., 2015). 
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Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2017) and Gaessler et al., 2018 investigate the role of  restrictions on 
preferential regimes, with a particular focus on the “modified nexus approach”. IP boxes with 
nexus requirement effectively preclude tax benefits from the transfer of intangibles and, thus, seem 
to result in much smaller cross-border spillovers.  
While most studies concentrate on the location of new patents, Alstadsæter et al. (2018) not only 
look at patent registration, but also on the location of researchers. Using patent applications to the 
EPO of world corporate R&D investors from 39 home countries in 33 different host countries 
over 2000-12, this paper suggests that patent boxes have a strong effect on patent registrations, 
especially when these regimes are generous and have a large coverage in terms of the types of IP 
covered. When it comes to real activity, the tax advantage linked to IP boxes is associated 
negatively with the annual growth in the number of inventors and also negatively with the 
probability that a MNE moves inventors from other affiliates to an affiliate in a patent box country.  
As intellectual property is firm-specific in nature, arm’s length prices are difficult to obtain. This 
creates opportunities for MNEs to shift income to low-tax countries by mispricing intra-firm 
royalties and license fees. Papers looking for evidence on such profit shifting are part of a closely 
related strand of the literature. Dischinger and Riedel (2011) find that the lower a subsidiary’s 
corporate tax rate compared to all other affiliates of the same multinational group, including also 
the parent, the higher is its probability of holding intangible assets there. Karkinsky and Riedel 
(2012) show that the number of patent applications filed by multinational affiliates strongly 
responds to changes in corporate tax rate. The estimated semi-elasticity ranges between -3.5% and 
-3.8%. At the same time, there are no statistically significant negative effects on patent applications 
for purely domestic firms, which lack low-tax affiliates. Bӧhm et al. (2012) analyze the extent to 
which corporations use patents to transfer corporate income to tax favored locations within 
multinational groups. They provide evidence that low-tax countries are more likely to attract 
ownership of foreign-invented patents. Indeed, the majority of patents owned in tax-haven 
locations is invented in a foreign country. Griffith et al. (2014) suggests a negative and statistically 
significant marginal impact of tax on the payoff from placing legal ownership of a patent in a 
location, where the own-tax semi-elasticity of patent location choice varies between –0.5% and 
3.9%. Dudar and Vogel (2016) conclude that companies seem to use intangible assets as an 
instrument of base erosion and profit shifting. Several other studies provide more direct evidence 
on the fact that IP ownership creates opportunities for strategic mispricing of intrafirm trade (e.g. 
Hebous and Johannesen, 2015; Liu et al., 2017; Hopland et al., 2018). Recently, Baumann et al. 
(2020) provide descriptive evidence on the negative correlation between a country’s patent income 
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tax rate and its fraction of foreign-invented patents, suggesting that the propensity to locate patent 
ownership in foreign tax haven economies increases in the inventor country’s patent income tax 
rate.  
A rich study on the tax effects on innovation and patents in the U.S. is Akcigit et al., (2021). While 
it shows that the corporate tax has a significantly negative effect on patents, this comes 
“predominantly from mobility responses” (p. 4) suggesting that aggregate effects across U.S. states 
are zero-sum. This leaves open the effect of international tax rate differences. Knoll et al. (2021) 
consider multinational firms and their reactions to input-related R&D tax incentives such as tax 
credits, accelerated depreciation or super-deductions. The results suggest that MNEs respond to 
R&D tax incentives by relocating patent activity within the MNE rather than by increasing their 
aggregate patent activity. 
 
3. A Model of R&D location within an MNE 
This section studies the decision making on R&D expenditures in a simply model, in which an 
MNE consists of two subsidiaries in two different countries, labelled 1, 2. The main objective of 
the exercise is to show that the size of the standard corporate tax rate may have a positive effect 
on local R&D if (i) R&D cost are deductible against this standard rate and (ii) the benefits of R&D 
are partly taxed at some other rate, either at a foreign one or at a rate deriving from a preferential 
IP regime.  
In our framework, R&D expenditures of one subsidiary increase the productivity of both 
subsidiaries. A further effect of R&D and the production of IP is that leads to royalties for the 
subsidiary that carries out the respective R&D, leading to an extra benefit for the R&D-conducting 
subsidiary. We distinguish two tax rates in both countries. !! 	denotes the standard corporate tax 
rate in country # = 1,2; ("#! 	is the rate on royalty income in country #, that may benefit from an 
IP regime, such that this rate may or may not fall short of !! .  
The IP, labelled ), within the MNE derives from the sum of IP of both subsidiaries, ) = )$ +







< 0	where ,! 	denotes the research expenditures of subsidiary #. Assuming 
the same cost of research across countries, it is also a measure of the amount of research 
undertaken. The profit in each subsidiary is then a strictly concave function of total IP, 1!()). 
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Royalty incomes for the subsidiaries in country 1 and 2 are simply modelled as 2)$(,$) and 
2)%(,%), where 2 may be thought of as the share of IP that cannot only be used to increase MNE 
productivity but can also be sold on the market. Net of tax, the global MNE profit derives as:  
Π = (1 − !$){1$()) − ,$} + (1 − ("#$){2)$(,$)}	     (1)	
					+(1 − !%){1%()) − ,%} + (1 − ("#%){2)%(,%)}. 
The Lagrangian of the profit maximization problem can be written as 7 = Π + 8$,$ + 8%,%, 
where 8$ and 8% represent Kuhn-Tucker multipliers for the non-negativity constraints on local 
research expenditures. The two first-order conditions for a profit maximum are:  














: + 8! = 0 for #, = = 1,2; # ≠ =.     (2) 
Consider a special case, which is particularly easy to analyze, where just one subsidiary, say in 
country 1, conducts research (8$ = 0; ,$ > 0)	and the other subsidiary is in a corner solution 
with (8% > 0; ,% = 0). In this case, a marginal change d!! or d("#$ leaves constant ,%. This, in 
the following, will be assumed for ease of presentation.  
A change in the corporate tax rate of country 1, may have different effects, depending on whether 
an IP regime is in place or not. The effect of a corporate tax rate change in the presence of an IP 
regime can be derived by marginally changing !$, but leaving the rate on IP income (royalties) 













> 0,         (3) 
where  

















The positive sign of  d%!d&!  in equation (3) results as, due to our concavity assumptions, all three terms 
in the denominator are negative and, at the same time, the numerator is negative from the first 
order condition. It establishes a somewhat counter-intuitive result according to which a corporate 
tax increase can positively affect local R&D.  
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If country 1 changes its corporate tax rate without having an IP regime in place, the effect on ,$ 
















> 0.       (4) 
With -) = .93), the numerator (as the denominator) continues to be negative, but the positive term 
2 &#:&': tends to dampen the positive effect of an increase in !$. Evaluating equation (3) and (4) for 
the same set of initial tax rates yields  d':d+:
> ,':,+:A,+:-,.;<:
> 0.	 
Next, consider a marginal change in .93) assuming an IP regime is present and d!$ = 0. From 









< 0.        (5) 
This leads to the formulation of the following hypotheses, which are empirically testable.  
H1. An increase in the corporate tax rate of a country increases the local R&D expenditures of MNEs.  
H2. The increase in local R&D expenditures of MNEs upon an increase in the corporate tax rate is higher if 
IP income in the respective country is subject to a separate tax rate (IP regime) than if this is not the case.  
H3. If there is an IP regime in place, an increase of the local tax rate on IP income will decrease local R&D.  
Clearly, the above model introduced a very simple framework. Several limitations come to mind 
and may or may not be important factors in practice.  
The corporate tax modeled above resembles a pure profits tax, as all costs are tax deductible. Real 
world corporate taxes differ and usually disallow deduction of some cost, for example, the 
opportunity cost of equity. Therefore, high real-world taxes, unlike the corporate tax in the above 
model, may induce the MNE to exit a country or enter a different one. This would have a negative 
effect on R&D in high-tax countries, possibly negatively affecting the empirical support for H1 
and H2. Despite this possibility, the mechanism described above would work against such a 
reduction of R&D and cushion the effect of a corporate tax increase.  
Another caveat applies to the implicit assumption of the model that tax rates indeed are relevant 
as all subsidiaries have positive taxable profits. In so far, as some real-world MNEs have 
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sufficiently powerful tax avoidance instruments that already wipe out taxes, the above mechanisms 
would have reduced predictive power. 
Another possible concern is that the model does not explicitly allow for contract R&D. Within an 
MNE, a low-tax subsidiary could pay a high-tax subsidiary to conduct R&D services on behalf of 
the low-tax subsidiary (Griffith et al., 2014, p.14). While this has not been explicitly modelled, the 
possibility of such schemes should reinforce the expectation that the cost deductibility of R&D 
expenditures is an argument to conduct real R&D activity in high-tax countries, given that the 
MNE wishes to be present in those countries.  
 
4. Data  
The empirical part of the paper uses aggregated data, although the above model discussed the 
decision problem of a single MNE. Unfortunately, company accounts data does not typically 
distinguish the geographical location of firm’s R&D activities and multinationals report R&D 
expenditures at consolidated level. Therefore, we use data on R&D expenditures of majority-
owned foreign affiliates of U.S. MNEs, reported at country level. We obtain the data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) homepage. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study using the BEA’s direct investment data for investigating tax policy effects on real research 
activity.  
The BEA database contains the R&D expenditures of U.S. majority-owned foreign affiliates as 
performed by the relevant foreign affiliates. Should one affiliate pay a second affiliate within the 
same MNE to conduct R&D, then the R&D expenditure would be attributed to that second 
affiliate; no R&D cost are recorded for the first, merely contracting U.S. affiliate.4 This accounting 
convention is adequate for our purpose, as our main interest is in where the actual research 
activities take place and how these activities are affected by taxation.5  
 
4 According to the BEA data description, R&D expenditures refer to expenditures for the planned, systematic pursuit of new knowledge 
or understanding toward general application (basic research); the acquisition of knowledge or understanding to meet a specific, recognized 
need (applied research); and the application of knowledge or understanding toward the production or improvement of a product, service, 
process, or method (development). It excludes quality control, routine product testing, market research, sales promotion, sales service and 
other nontechnical activities; routine technical services; geological and geophysical exploration activities, and advertising programs to 
promote or demonstrate new products or processes. Also excluded are capital expenditures, expenditures for tests and evaluations once a 
prototype becomes a production model, patent expenses, and income taxes and interest.  
5 The R&D expenditures reported in our data are attributed to the affiliate that conducts the real research activity. Therefore, any income 
from the patent(s) associated with the R&D expenditures reported in the respective country and year would satisfy the nexus 
requirement, if in place in that country. Consequently, we do not control for the nexus requirement. 
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Our sample includes seventy-five countries where U.S. multinationals have reported R&D 
expenditures for at least one year during the period under analysis, 2009-2017.6 In total, the sample 
includes 621 country-year observations, resulting in a slightly unbalanced panel with only 54 
missing country-year entries.  
The presence of an IP regime in the host country in a certain year constitutes the first variable of 
interest in our empirical analysis. Table A3 in Appendix A reports information on the existence of 
an IP regime in each country-year, the year of enactment and the preferential tax rate on IP income. 
For the construction of this variable, we rely on the OECD (2015) Final Report and OECD (2017). 
Further sources used for identifying IP regimes where data from multinational professional 
services networks such KPMG, PwC, Deloitte, as well as from national websites, and previous 
working papers.  
A second variable of main interest is the tax rate on IP income. As in the model of Section 3, it 
equals the preferential IP tax rate for countries that run an IP regime. For countries that do not 
run an IP regime, the tax rate on IP income equals the statutory corporate income tax rate. We 
tale the information on the statutory corporate income tax rate from the OECD Statistics 
Database, KPMG, and Eurostat. For the preferential corporate income tax rates on IP income, 
the sources of information are significantly broader and coincide with the ones used for data 
collection on the presence of IP regimes in each country.7  
Finally, we add control variables on non-tax country characteristics. We refer to prior literature 
(Bӧhm et al., 2015; Dudar and Voget, 2016; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Alstadsaeter et al., 2018; 
Baumann et al., 2020; Mukherjee et al., 2017; Becker et al., 2020), for the choice of the control 
variables in the baseline regression and for the two additional control variables used in the 
robustness checks analysis. We include LN (GDP) to control for market size, which measures the 
log of GDP in purchasing power parities. Since tax rates and country sizes have been found to be 
systematically correlated, inclusion of this size measure prevents the tax rate from picking up size 
effects (Weichenrieder, 2005; Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2012). In order to control for the country’s 
degree of development and living standards, the logarithm of GDP per capita is included. In line 
with Dischinger and Riedel (2012), as a proxy for the country’s economic situation, we include the 
unemployment rate. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) represents the Transparency 
 
6 Among the 163 countries listed in the database, R&D expenditures of U.S. MNEs are greater than 0, for at least one year between 
2009-2017 in only 75 countries. For the rest of countries, data on R&D expenditures is missing for all the years or reported as 0 only for 
one or two years. 
7 See table A2 in Appendix A, for the definition of all variables used and the list of the data sources for each of them. 
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International corruption index, which is constructed with higher values of the index indicating 
lower corruption, in order to capture perceptions of the public sector corruption, the quality of 
public services, the quality of policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the 
governments’ commitment to such policies. Table A1 in Appendix A reports summary statistics 
of all variables used. As a robustness check (Appendix B1, Table B1) we also included a Property 
Rights Index as included in several studies (Becker et al., 2020; Alstadsæter et al., 2018; Karkinsky 
and Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014; Bradley et al., 2015) and trade openness (Trade) as in Ernst 
and Spengel (2011). We excluded these consistently insignificant variables in the regressions of 
Table 1. Appendix B, Table 3 includes an (insignificant) variable that captures the availability of 
input related R&D tax credits.  
Figure 1 visualizes the R&D expenditures in the top-10 host countries in absolute and relative 
terms. Germany, a high-tax country, leads the top-10 countries where U.S. multinationals locate 
their R&D expenditures, accounting for between 6,700 and 9,200 million dollar or between 14% 
and 20% of  total foreign R&D expenditures. Germany is followed by United Kingdom and 
Canada until 2012 (Switzerland after 2012). Among the top-10 countries, four of  them, Germany, 
Canada, Switzerland9 and Japan, fail to have a preferential tax rate regime during the period under 
consideration. The first three of  them lead the top-10 list. The statutory corporate tax rate in Japan 
is the highest among all countries where U.S. majority-owned subsidiaries invest in R&D, with a 
range between 30.89% in 2017 and 40.69% in 2009. India as well offered one of  the highest 
statutory corporate income tax rates hovering around 34% and 35% between 2009 and 2017, but 
it implemented an IP box regime in 2016 with a preferential tax rate on IP income of  about 10%. 
China, that enacted an IP regime in 2008 and France, which has an IP regime since 1971, have the 
highest preferential tax rate (15%) among the rest of  the six countries that run an IP regime. The 
United Kingdom, after the 2013 enactment of  an IP box introduced a preferential tax rate of  10%. 
In the year of  IP box enactment, the tax advantage was about 13%. It decreased to 9% after a 
year-by-year decrease of  the statutory corporate income tax rate (19% in 2017). 
A country with frequent changes is Israel. Its statutory corporate income tax rate ranges between 
24% and 26% and its preferential tax rate within the period changes from 10% to 7%, then again 
to 9% and in the last two years 2016, 2017 it decreases to 6%. Ireland, which provided the lowest 
 
9 In 2011, the Canton of Nidwalden in Switzerland introduced a License Box Regime, which provided exemption at the cantonal level, but 
not at the federal level, equal to 80% of eligible income. Given that the tax advantage was not given at the federal level, in the regressions 
below, Switzerland is considered as a country without IP regime (Guenther, 2017, p.9). Switzerland recently introduced a patent box regime 
going into effect in 2020, which covers all of Switzerland. The regime will provide a maximum tax base reduction of 90% on income from 
patents and similar rights developed in Switzerland. Cantons can opt for a lower reduction.  
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tax rate on IP income, 2.5% for 2009 and 2010, abolished its IP regime in 2010 and re-introduced 
it in 2016 with a preferential tax rate of  6.5%.  
Figure 2, for each of the 22 countries with IP regimes, compares the mean corporate tax rate and 
the mean preferential IP rate across the years when an IP-regime was in place. The largest 
difference between the two mean rates is in Uruguay, Colombia and Macau, the smallest difference 
applies to the Republic of Korea. 
Fig. 1. R&D Expenditures of U.S. wholly - owned subsidiaries by top-10 host countries in (a) 




Fig.1 (a). R&D Expenditures of U.S Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries.                                    Fig.1 (b). R&D Expenditures of U.S. Wholly-Owned Subsidiaries 
abroad by Top-10 Host Countries                                                                                               abroad by Top-10 Host Countries 
(in million US dollars)                                                                                                 (fraction of total foreign expenditures) 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
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Fig. 2. Comparing the preferential tax rate on IP income and statutory corporate income tax rate 




Countries corresponding to the 
country codes in our sample, as 
shown in the horizontal axis: 
7-France; 10-Ireland; 11-Israel; 14-













Keen (2001) and others have argued that preferential tax regimes may allow for higher standard 
corporate tax rates since, with such a special regime, parts of the most mobile tax base are taken 
out of the high-taxed base. We checked whether this is reflected in our sample. 12 out of 22 IP-
regime countries had the regime in place during all of our sample years; 10 countries had years 
with and without IP regimes. For these 10 countries, the mean statutory corporate tax rate in years 
without an IP regime (24.6%) is almost identical to the average rate in years with an IP regime 
(23.2%). Controlling for country and time-fixed effects, we found an insignificant negative 
correlation between an IP regime dummy and the rate of the statutory corporate tax rate. This 
finding does not support the idea that countries introduce a preferential regime to be able to 
increase their rates on the remaining tax base.  
Among the 22 countries, Ireland, Israel, Netherlands, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Korea and Spain 
had different rates of the preferential tax rate on IP across the years in which a regime had been 
in place. For the rest, the tax rate on IP income did not change.  
 
5. Estimations  
In this section, we exploit our panel data to regress country-level R&D expenditures of US-owned 
subsidiaries on country characteristics that capture R&D-friendliness from a tax and non-tax 
perspective. Based on the model in Section 3, our main interest is in the corporate tax rate, the 
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availability of a preferred patent box regime, and the interaction between tax rates and regimes. 
This leads us to the following empirical model.  
LN(R&D)it = 
 α0 + β1 iprit + β2 τIP_it + β3 Stat_CITit + δ1 Stat_CITit * iprit + β4 Xit+ φi + γt  + uit      (6)  
Our left-hand variable, LN (R&D)it, represents the natural log of R&D expenditures by U.S. 
majority-owned subsidiaries in country i in year t.10  In each country there are two, possibly distinct, 
tax rates: the standard statutory corporate income tax rate applying to all kinds of deductions and 
sales revenues (Stat_CITit ), and the tax rate as it applies specifically to income from intellectual 
property (τIP_it ). Although these rates may be identical if the country under consideration does not 
offer a patent box regime, this separation allows to account for regime changes over time and a 
lower rate on income from intellectual property. The dummy variable  iprit takes on the value one 
if in country i in year t there is an IP regime in place, and zero otherwise. The interaction term 
Stat_CITit * iprit captures the possibly different effect of the statutory corporate income tax rate 
on R&D expenditures if an IP box is in place. In this case, an increase in the corporate tax may 
increase the value of the tax deductibility of research expenditures, but would ceteris paribus not 
increase the tax on IP income. For this reason, we expect a positive coefficient for this interaction 
that captures a difference in the marginal effect of the statutory corporate income tax rate between 
countries with an IP-regime in place and countries that do not offer a preferential tax treatment 
for IP income. Xit is a vector including the four country-specific control variables, described in the 
previous section. The variable φi represents country-fixed effects, capturing a country’s unobserved 
characteristics that are time-invariant. 11 The variable γt captures year-fixed effects that may affect 
all host countries alike.  
While OLS is easy to interpret, a logarithmic or semi logarithmic OLS model may be biased if the 
data is heteroscedastic (Silva and Tenreyo, 2006). Another possible concern is that OLS does not 
account for the fact that the dependent variable is restricted to positive values (Karkinsky and 
Riedel, 2012; Alstadsæter et al., 2018). Moreover, country-years with zero R&D are dropped by 
taking the log. In order to account for these concerns, we also use a negative binomial (NB) fixed 
effects model. We follow Allison and Waterman (2002) and Greene (2007), suggesting a simple 
 
10 By taking the natural logarithm of R&D expenditures in millions of dollars, we lose only 33 observations. A robustness check in Appendix 
B estimates equation (1) by using an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine transformation of our dependent variable that keeps these observations. 
Table B2 in Appendix B reports very similar results to Table 1 and Table 2, although some coefficients of interest are slightly higher.  
11 A Hausman test suggested that the fixed-effects model is more appropriate than a random-effects model. 
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approach which jointly estimates the parameters, fixed effects and the over-dispersion model in a 
standard NB model with a full set of country specific dummy variables.12  
A further potential issue are endogeneity problems. For example, countries could be tempted to 
introduce an IP regime in years in which R&D expenditures of local U.S. are particularly low. This 
produced a problem of reverse causality. This is a general problem of the IP regime literature, 
which according to our knowledge has not been addressed fully convincingly in previous studies. 
See the discussion in Alstadsæter et al. (2018, p. 150). This said, we want to note that a main interest 
of this study is to evaluate the role of the general corporate tax rate on R&D. Compared to the 
introduction of IP regimes, this general rate should be less susceptible of being set as an intentional 
instrument of R&D policy. If true, this should reduce the problem of endogeneity compared to 
the papers on IP regimes reviewed in Section 2. A potential omitted variables problem is addressed 
by using country fixed effects and further time-varying country characteristics.   
 
5.1. Empirical Results 
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 report on OLS fixed effects model estimations, columns (3) and 
(4) report on the NB model. The NB estimations contain the same set of regressors as the OLS 
regression in column (1) and column (2). While the left-hand side is now measured in level rather 
than its logarithm, the coefficients of tax rates in the negative binomial model can be interpreted 
as semi-elasticities. To account for heteroscedasticity and possible serial correlations, we cluster all 
estimates in Table 1 at the country level.13 
We first focus on the interpretation of column (2), where the full set of control variables in an 
OLS regression is included to discuss the hypotheses H1 – H3 of Section 3. As discussed in that 
section, a change in the statutory corporate tax rate may be different depending on whether the 
variation happens with an IP regime in place or not.  
In the absence of an IP regime, a change in Stat_CIT, by construction, goes along with a change 
in τIP_it, as the standard corporate tax then also applies to IP income. This means that, in this case, 
a one percentage point increase in the CIT leads to an increase in R&D expenditures by some 
0.9% (= -0.0279 + 0.0364). This, however, is not statistically significant according to line (i) and 
lends no particular support to H1. Section 3 discussed potential reasons, why effects outside our 
 
12 Although this suggestion may have an incidental parameter problem, Allison and Waterman (2002) and Greene (2004) suggest that the 
resultant incidental parameters bias is not disturbing due to moderately small time dimension (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013, p.357). 
13 Presence of heteroscedasticity is suggested by scatterplots of fitted, predicted and residual values, Breusch-Pagan test, White test and a modified 
Wald statistic for group-wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals of a fixed-effect regression model. 
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model could actually lead to a negative effect of the corporate tax rate on R&D. Against this 
background, it is an interesting observation that a higher tax rate does not seem to have a negative 
effect on R&D.   
Compared to when an IP regime is not in place, H2 expresses the expectation that an increase of 
the corporate tax has a more positive effect on R&D if such a regime is in place. A change in the 
corporate tax rate, in this case, leaves the tax on IP income constant as this income is subject to a 
separate rate. The marginal effect in column 2 then derives from the addition of the coefficient of 
Stat_CIT and the coefficient of the interaction effect IP Regime (dummy) * Statutory CIT: (0.0364 
– 0.0086 =) 2.78% (cf. line (ii)). This linear combination of coefficients is significantly different 
from zero at the 1%-level. At the 5%-significance level, the marginal effect of the corporate tax 
increase with an IP regime in place (2.78%) is higher than the marginal effect without a regime 
(0.9%) according to line (iii). While significance levels are slightly lower in the NB models for some 
coefficients, the general pattern is preserved and the size of the coefficients is closely comparable, 
which should give further credibility to the OLS estimates.  
The observation that a marginal change in the corporate tax rate has a larger effect if an IP regime 
is in place is in line with our expectation (H2). In countries without a preferential tax rate regime 
on IP income, a higher corporate tax makes the deductibility of R&D cost more valuable, but also 
increases the tax on R&D returns. This is different in IP regime countries, where the income 
generated from IP is sheltered by the IP regime.  
The positive and strongly significant effect of the statutory CIT on R&D expenditures in these 
countries is compatible with the view that subsidiaries manage to deduct a large share of the cost 
of R&D at the higher statutory corporate tax rate, while the returns of R&D investments benefit 
from the lower IP rate. Although formally, this is only allowed under the gross income approach, 
it could be that countries are lenient under the net income approach and effectively there is always 
a de facto gross approach in place. With R&D costs largely consisting of labor costs, firms might 
easily report R&D costs as normal costs in order to get their deductibility under the normal 
statutory corporate income tax rate, while maintaining returns from R&D taxed at the lower 
(preferential) corporate income tax rate. 
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Table 1. Estimating tax effects on international R&D expenditures of U.S. majority-owned 
subsidiaries. 
 
Note:  The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the log of R&D expenditures; in the negative binomial models of columns 
(3) and (4) R&D expenditures (in $mill) is used. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p-values are based on 
robust standard errors, clustered at the country level. Countries are observed during 2009-2017 (unbalanced sample). All estimations 
include country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects. Numbers in columns (1) and (2) represent coefficients rather than odds ratios. 
The unit of observation is country–year. The alpha parameter informs about the degree of dispersion, if alpha is significantly greater 
than zero the data are over dispersed and are better estimated using a negative binomial model than a Poisson model. 
 
The coefficient of IP Regime (dummy), is not statistically significant across columns. This in itself 
would indicate no significant increase of R&D expenditures if a host country introduces such a 
Dependent Variable: R&D Expenditures of U.S. majority-owned subsidiaries  
Model         OLS          OLS 
 
      NBM      NBM 
   
LN (R&D Expn.) 
 





Regressors          (1)          (2) (3) (4) 
IP Regime (dummy)  
(iprit) 
    -0.156 
    (0.210) 
 
    -0.318 
(0.203) 
 
   -0.0211 
    (0.195) 
 
    -0.221 
(0.187) 
 




























IP Regime (dummy) * Statutory CIT  































Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) 






(i) τIP_it  +  Stat_CITi 0.0097     0.0085 0.0141 0.0075 
 (0.293)     (0.349) (0.241) (0.546) 
(ii) (1 + iprit)*Stat_CITit  0.0241***     0.0278*** 0.0249*** 0.0249** 
 (0.005)     (0.004) (0.006) (0.018) 
(iii):     (ii) – (i) 0.0141**     0.0193** 0.0109* 0.0174** 
          (0.038)     (0.011) (0.091) (0.013) 
Obs. 588      572 621 597 
Nr. of countries 75       72 75 72 
R2  (within)/ Pseudo R2 0.30     0.36 0.30 0.31 
Log pseudolikelihood   -2846.15 -2765.56 
Alpha for overdispersion (std. 
error) 
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regime; the coefficient is even negative. At the same time, such a regime allows for a reduced rate 
on intellectual property income. The effect of an IP Regime derives from both the IP Regime 
(dummy) and the reduced tax rate on IP income (τIP_it). The significantly negative coefficient of 
this latter variable indicates that (given an IP regime is in place) a lower tax rate on IP income 
(keeping the corporate income tax constant) indeed is associated with higher R&D expenditures: 
a reduction of the rate on IP income by one percentage point increases local R&D expenditure by 
some 2.8%.15 Again, the results are closely comparable across columns and models (OLS/NB), 
providing support for H3. As noted, to evaluate whether the introduction of an IP regime has a 
stimulating effect on R&D, a look at the coefficient of iprit is insufficient, as an IP regime also 
comes with a reduced tax. Assuming that the introduction of an IP regime reduces the applicable 
rate from the average of the corporate income tax rate (24.1%) rate to the average rate of IP 
regimes in the sample (8.0%), from column (2), we receive a small positive overall effect of 0.128 
(= −0.318 + 16 ∙ 0.0279) on the log of R&D expenditures.  However, the suggested increase is 
statistically insignificant. 
The coefficients of the four control variables have plausible signs. We find a positive effect of 
country size on R&D, as measured by the coefficient of LN (GDP). Freedom of corruption (CPI) 
enters positively, although only insignificantly in the NB model. A negative effect of the 
unemployment rate is weakly significant in the OLS and insignificant in the NB model. GDP per 
capita, LN (GDP pC), enters positively, but without statistical significance.  
 
5.2. Gross income approach  
The results in Table 1 are based on a pooling of IP regimes with a gross or a net approach. This 
reflected the expectation that, for tax purposes, it is difficult to tell apart R&D related expenditures 
from other expenditures. In such a situation, MNEs have, for tax purposes, the incentive to flag 
R&D expenditures as normal expenditures to receive an increased tax shelter and de facto the 
distinction of the net and gross approach should be of restricted relevance in practice.  
At the same time, it is possible to tell apart the few countries that indeed use a gross approach de 
jure. It should be kept in mind, though, that in this case some results are then based on a very 
limited subsample. In our data set, out of the 22 countries that used an IP regime during 2009-
2017, only Belgium, Hungary, Portugal, and Spain used the gross approach of an IP regime at least 
 
15 Note that changing the IP rate and holding the CIT rate constant is only possible for iprit = 1. 
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for some years.16  As one of our main interests lies in the R&D effect from a change of the 
corporate tax rate (i.e., in an interaction effect), identification depends on observing corporate tax 
rate changes while an IP regime is in place. In the group of the four IP regimes countries with a 
gross approach, only two, Hungary and Portugal, had at least one corporate tax rate change during 
our sample period. Three of the four countries had a tax rate change when it comes to the rate on 
IP income (Hungary, Portugal and Spain).  
To identify possibly different effects for gross and net income approaches, we slightly modify our 
empirical framework. We introduce a further dummy variable named Gross_approachit, which takes 
on the value one if a country with a preferential IP regime in year t allows the current R&D 
expenses to be deducted from non-IP income, which is taxed at the regular corporate tax rate. In 
addition, this new dummy is interacted with the standard corporate tax rate and the IP rate forming 
the variables Gross_approach*Stat_CIT and Gross_approach*τIP . Consequently, the new regression 
equation reads: 
LN (R&D Expn.)it = α0 + β1 iprit  + β2τIP_it + β3 Stat_CITit + 
+ δ1 Stat_CITit * iprit+ β4 Gross_approachit + δ2 Gross_approachit * Stat_CITit +  
+ δ3 Gross_approachit * τIP_it +β5Xit + φi + γt + uit                                                                                 (7) 
 
Table 2 reports the results for equation (7). The four columns again report on OLS and NB 
regressions. The full set of controls is included in columns (2) and (4), while in columns (1) and 
(3) only the main variables of interest are included.  
We first concentrate on the results for OLS in column (2). As in Table 1, the preferential tax rate 
on IP income enters significantly negative for R&D expenditures, resulting in a semi-elasticity of 
some -3.4%. As we have added an additional interaction of this rate with the gross approach 
dummy, the value of 3.4% is estimated for net approach regimes. The interaction with the gross 
approach dummy enters surprisingly with a positive sign that is statistically significant in columns 
(2) and (4), although not in (1) and (3).  
Again, the statutory corporate income tax rate increases R&D expenditures only insignificantly in 
countries that do not offer a preferential tax rate on IP income, while it exerts a positive effect of 
some 2.6%, significant at the 5% significance level in countries that have an IP regime (net income 
approach) in place.  
 
16 Spain moved from a ‘gross-income’ to a ‘net-income approach’ as part of the comprehensive reform of the IP Box implemented in 
September 2013 (Law 14/2013 of 27 September 2013), (Evers, 2015, p.71). 
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The heterogeneity we are interested in when estimating equation (7) concerns the new variables 
that indicate the application of the gross income approach. A significantly positive coefficient of 
Gross_approach*Stat_CIT would suggest that IP regimes with a gross approach help better to 
cushion the effects of a corporate tax increase than those with net approach. The fact that we 
observe only an insignificant positive coefficient is in line with the view that de facto, all IP boxes 
tend to be used as if they were following the gross income approach. This said, we should also 
keep in mind the limited observations that identify the size of the interaction effect and that limits 
statistical power.  
If we concentrate on IP-regime countries with a gross approach in place, the coefficient 
representing the marginal effect of the statutory corporate income tax rate on the log of R&D 
expenditures is hardly changed (2.68%) compared to net approach countries, but is not significant 
according to the test in line (iv) of Table 2.  
Somewhat less expected, the coefficient on the interaction Gross_approach*τIP , turns out positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% significance level in columns (2) and (4). It suggests that there 
is a difference on the effect of the preferential tax rate depending on whether a change in the tax 
rate happens in a gross or net IP regime approach. Lowering the preferential rate in a gross 
approach, which should be the more generous approach, seems to be less stimulating for R&D. 
Again, the fact that the estimation is based on tax rate change in only a few (here three) countries 
adds an important caveat.  
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Table 2. Tax effects on R&D expenditures: Differentiating between gross and net approaches. 
 
Note: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the log of R&D expenditures, in columns (3) and (4) R&D expenditures (in 
$mill). Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. p-values in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered 
at the country level. The model is estimated via OLS estimation method in regressions (1) and (2), and via a negative binomial 
model in regressions (3) and (4). Countries are observed during the period 2009-2017 (unbalanced sample). All estimations include 
country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects. Numbers in columns (1) and (2) represent coefficients rather than odds ratios. The 
unit of observation is country–year. The alpha parameter informs about the degree of dispersion, if alpha is significantly greater 
than zero the data are over dispersed and are better estimated using a negative binomial model than a Poisson model. 
Dependent Variable: R&D Expenditures of U.S. majority-owned subsidiaries 
Model OLS  OLS  
 
NBM NBM 




R&D Expn. R&D Expn. 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) 












































































































(i) τIP_it  +  Stat_CITi 0.0085 
 
0.0080 0.012 0.0067 
(ii) (1 + iprit)*Stat_CITit  0.019** 0.0256** 0.0209** 0.023** 
(iii):    (ii) – (i) 0.0107* 0.0176** 0.0086 0.016** 
(iv) (1 +  iprit + Gross approach)*Stat_CITit 0.037 0.026 0.029 0.018 
(v):   (iv) – (ii) 0.018 0.012 0.008 -0.0046 
(vi)  τIP_it  (1 + Gross approach)   0.011 0.012 0.016 0.018 
Obs. 588 572 621 597 
Nr. of countries 75 72 75 72 
R2  (within)/ Pseudo R2 0.30 0.36 0.30 0.31 
Log pseudolikelihood   -2844.55 -2764.64   
Alpha for overdispersion  
(std. error) 
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A growing literature indicates that high corporate taxes are detrimental to the number of patent 
applications by MNEs in these high-tax countries. Conversely, the question of whether high 
corporate taxes also reduce R&D expenditures and real research activity has received much less 
attention, but is the focus of the present paper. We hope that this paper may trigger a larger 
discussion on taxes and the location of real R&D activities. While the location of patents may be 
informative on tax planning activities of MNEs, in the end, we expect that it is the location of real 
R&D activity that is decisive when it comes to international spillover effects in knowledge.  
Using a model of R&D decisions by MNEs, we identified mechanisms that could induce more 
R&D expenditures when the tax rate increases. An intuition for this somewhat counter-intuitive 
tax effect is that R&D costs are tax deductible and the value of this deduction tends to be the 
highest where the corporate tax is the highest. Given that R&D expenditures are tax deductible 
against the high corporate taxes, the possible positive R&D effect reflects a tax asymmetry: not all 
R&D returns are subject to the higher tax. First, since R&D creates a public good within the MNE, 
some of the R&D benefit is taxed at other countries’ tax rates that are not subject to the tax 
increase. Second, some of the R&D benefits are taxed at a lower IP regime tax rate. Therefore, a 
higher corporate tax, which increases value of the cost deductibility of R&D, may foster R&D.  
This expectation is empirically supported by country-by-country R&D data of U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries for countries that do have an IP regime. When it comes to the effect of IP regimes, 
we find a small overall impact on R&D expenditures, which is insignificant.  
Several caveats and opportunities for future research remain. One issue is that our theoretical 
model is tailored to MNEs. It does not necessarily allow similar conclusions for national firms that 
conduct R&D. On the empirical side, one possible problem is that, as in the vast majority of papers 
evaluating the tax effects on patent behavior, we have taken changes in tax characteristics of 
countries as exogenous variations. While countries’ corporate tax rate decisions, much more than 
IP regimes, may be set with a focus on a broad set of goals, we cannot rule out that corporate taxes 
are set also with an eye to attracting R&D. At the same time, we did not find evidence that 
countries that introduced an IP regime systematically changed their headline corporate tax.  
Our empirical estimations are based on the R&D expenditures of U.S. wholly-owned subsidiaries, 
aggregated at the country-year level. Although the U.S. reports R&D for up to 75 different 
countries, confirming our results with confidential BEA firm-level data would be a worthwhile 
project, but would have to occur from within the BEA. Although subsidiary-level R&D 
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expenditures are difficult to attain, using data from non-U.S. MNEs would also be a useful 
endeavor.  
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Appendix A: Summary Statistics and Variables’ definitions 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics 
 
Table A2. Variables’ definition and data sources 
 
R&D expenditures 
Research and Development Expenditures of all U.S. Majority-owned Foreign Affiliates measured in 
millions of dollars, in country i in year t. 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce 
 
 LN (R&D expenditures) Natural logarithm of R&D expenditures Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce 
 
 
Statutory CIT Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rate 
Source: OECD Statistics database; KPMG International Corporate Tax Rates; EUROSTAT. 
 
Tax rate on IP income Tax rate on IP income equals the Statutory corporate income tax rate if the host country of the U.S. 
MNE’s majority-wholly owned subsidiaries does not have an IP box regime (or similar) in a specific 
year, and thus taxes the income generated from the exploitation of IP at the normal statutory 
corporate income tax rate. Otherwise, if an IP regime is in place in country i, in year t, this variable is 
equal to the preferential (lower) tax rate applied to the IP income based on the IP box rules of that 
country in the specific year. 
Source:  For the Statutory CIT: OECD Statistics database; KPMG International Corporate Tax 
Rates; EUROSTAT; For the preferential tax rate on IP income: Initial orientation: OECD database 
on Intellectual Property Regimes; OECD (2015);  OECD (2017); Atkinson and Andes (2011); Ernst 
and Young (2017) ; European Commission (2015);  Alstadsæter et al.  (2015); Evers et al. (2015);  
Evers  (2015); Sakar  (2015); De Rassenfosse (2015); Guenther (2017); Schwab and Todtenhaupt 





IP Regime (dummy) 
IP Regime (dummy) takes on the value one if the host country of the U.S. MNE’s majority-wholly 
owned subsidiaries has an IP regime in place in the specific year and zero otherwise.  Referring to 
OECD (2015) and OECD (2017), classification as IP Regime refers to: 1.)  IP Regimes of OECD 
and G20 countries, 2.) IP Regimes of new Inclusive Framework members, 3.) IP regimes of new 
inclusive framework members that are also reviewed as non IP regimes. Some preferential regimes 
provides. 
Source: OECD (2015);  OECD (2017); Atkinson and Andes (2011); Ernst and Young (2017); 
European Commission (2015);  Alstadsæter et al.  (2015); Evers et al. (2015); Evers  (2015); Sakar 
(2015); De Rassenfosse (2015); Guenther (2017); Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2017); KPMG; PwC; 
Deloitte; National Website Sources. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
R&D expenditures ($mill) 621 697.1465 1413.46 0 9133 
LN (R&D expenditures) 588 4.361953 2.655943 0 9.119 
Statutory Corporate income tax rate 621 24.09087 7.129464 0 40.69 
Preferential tax rate on IP income 135 8.030148 5.283505 0 16.5 
IP Regime  621 .2173913 .4128035 0 1 
Gross approach  621 . 0434783 .2040955 0 1 
LN (GDP) 617 26.24841   1.58703 22.26175 30.14147   
LN (GDP pC)  621 9.67313 1.11811 7.009761 12.15173 
Unemployment 616 7.388815 4.865881 0 27.47 
Corruption Perception Index  597 54.41876 20.73738 9 95 
Property Rights Index 607 59.14119 23.98959 0 97.1 
Trade 599 95.0702 69.43888 22.11 442.62 
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Gross approach (dummy) 
Gross income approach takes on the value one if the country that has an IP regime in place applies 
an asymmetric treatment of IP income and IP expenses and as long as the taxpayer has sufficient 
ordinarily taxed non-IP income from which to deduct the IP expenses, this can produce substantial 
tax advantage. Thus, this variable takes on the value one if  the current expenses are deductible from 
non-IP income, which is taxed at the regular corporate tax rate, and zero otherwise. 
Source:  Evers et al. (2014); Evers  (2015). 
 
LN (GDP) 
Natural logarithm of the GDP (in current $U.S.). GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
Source: World Development Indicators from the World Bank database 
 
 
LN (GDP Pc) 
Natural logarithm of the GDP per capita (in $U.S.), expressed in GDP in PPP dollars per person. 
Data are derived by dividing GDP in PPP dollars by total population. These data form the basis for 
the country weights used to generate the World Economic Outlook country group composites for 
the domestic economy.  
Source:  World Development Indicators Database;  International Monetary Fund:; United Nations 
 
Unemployment  Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking 
employment, thus it is expressed as the total % of total labor force). 
Source:  World Bank Database 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Transparency International corruption index, which is constructed with higher values of the index 
indicating lower level of corruption. 





Property Rights Index 
A subcomponent of the Index of Economic Freedom, the property rights index measures the degree to 
which a country laws protect private property rights, and the degree to which its government enforces 
those laws. The more certain the legal protection of property, the higher a country’s score; similarly, 
the greater the chances of government expropriation of property, the lower a country’s score. 
Countries that fall between two categories may receive an intermediate score. 
Source: The Heritage Foundation, 2020 Index of Economic Freedom 
Trade Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product. 
Source: World Development Indicators form World Bank database 
 
 
Table A3. List of IP regimes across countries 
Country IP regime  Existing before 
2009 or year of 
enactment 
Name of the regime Preferential tax rate  
Germany No 
 
    




China Yes Since 2008 Incentives for High and New Technology 
Enterprises (HNTE)  
15.00%  
India  Yes 2016 Patent-related Incentive 10.00%  
Canada No 
 
    
Ireland Yes 1973, 2008, 2016 Patent Box, Knowledge Development Box 2.5%; 6.25%   
Japan No 
 
    
Israel Yes Existing IP regime (Preferred Technology Enterprise/ 
Special Preferred Technology Enterprise status) 
10.00%; 7.00%; 9.00%; 6.00%  
France Yes 1971 Reduced rate for long term capital gains and 
profits from the licensing of IP rights 
15.00%  
Singapore Yes 2017 Intellectual Property Development Incentive 10.00%  
Netherlands Yes 2007, 2010 Patent Box, Innovation Box 5.00%  
Belgium Yes 2007 Patents Income Deduction 6.80%  





    
Brazil No 
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Italy Yes 2015 Taxation of income from intangible assets 13.95%  
Sweden No 
 
    
Denmark No 
 
    
Malaysia No 
 
    
Austria No 
 
    
Mexico No 
 
    
Taiwan No 
 
    
Spain Yes 2008, 2013 Partial exemption for income from certain 
intangible assets (Federal regime) 
15.00%; 12.00%  
Poland No 
 
   
Norway No 
 
   
Finland No 
 
   
Russia No 
 
   
Hong Kong No 
 
   
Luxembourg Yes Since 2008 Partial exemption for income/gains derived 




   
Czech Republic No 
 
   
Thailand Yes Existing before International headquarters regime/Regional 
operating headquarters regime 
10.00% 
Hungary Yes 2003, 2012 IP regime for royalties and capital gains 9.50%; 4.50% 
Peru No 
 
   
Costa Rica No 
 
   
Philippines No 
 
   
Turkey Yes 2015 Technology development zones regime 0.00% 
Bermuda No 
 
   
Colombia Yes 2013 Software Regime 0.00% 
Slovakia No 
 
   
Romania No 
 
   
South Africa No 
 
   
Portugal Yes 2014 Partial exemption for income from patents and 




   
Greece No 
 
   
New Zealand No 
 
   
Indonesia No 
 
   
Egypt No 
 
   
Bulgaria No 
 
   
Croatia No 
 
   
Venezuela No 
 
   
Saudi Arabia No 
 
   
Panama No 
 
   
Vietnam No 
 
   
Slovenia No 
 
   
Macau Yes Existing before  Macau offshore institution 0.00% 
Latvia No 
 
   
Ecuador No 
 
   
Honduras No 
 
   
Guatemala No 
 
   
Mauritius Yes Existing before Global Business License 1(3%) and 2 (0%) 
regime 
3.00% 
El Salvador No 
 
   
Ghana No 
 
   
Georgia No 
 
   
Dominican Rep. No 
 
   
Pakistan No 
 
   
Belarus No 
 
   
Monaco No 
 
   
Uruguay Yes Existing before Free Zones & Benefits under lit S art.52 for 
biotechnology and for software 
0.00% 
Barbados Yes Existing before International Business Companies  2.50% 
Morocco No 
 
   
Oman No 
 
   
Qatar No 
 
   
Jamaica No 
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Note: Classification as IP Regime refers to: 1.) IP Regimes of OECD and G20 countries, 2.) IP Regimes of new 
Inclusive Framework members, 3.) IP regimes of new inclusive framework members that are also reviewed as 
non IP regimes. Some preferential regimes provides for benefits to both income from IP and other non-IP 
geographically mobile activities. These “dual category” regimes are reviewed as both an IP regime and a non-IP 
regime and therefore have to comply with both substantial activities requirements and two separate conclusions 
are applicable to the regime. 
Main sources: OECD (2015); OECD (2017); OECD database on Intellectual Property Regimes. 
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Appendix B: Robustness Tests 
Table B1. Additional control variables  
Dependent Variable: R&D Expenditures of U.S. majority-owned subsidiaries 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS NBM NBM NBM NBM 
Explanatory. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
IP Regime (dummy)    -0.313 


















































































   -0.0178 















Gross approach (dummy)   -0.533 
(0.515) 
 
     -0.507 
(0.517) 
 


















Gross approach (dummy) * Tax Rate on IP 
income  
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 Note: This table consists on the estimation of equation (1) and (2) by adding two other control variables: Trade and Property Rights index. The dependent variable in columns (1), (2) (3), and (4) is the 
log of R&D expenditures, and the amount of R&D expenditures in columns (5), (6), (7), (8). The levels of significance are reported as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are robust to both 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using the cluster estimator, clustered at country level. The model is estimated via OLS estimation method in regression (1), (2) (3) and (4). In columns (1) - (4) and 
(3) – (4) all the main variables of interest preserve their sign and their significance levels as respectively in table 1 (column 1 and 2) and table 2 (column 1 and 2). In addition, the model is estimated via a 
negative binomial model in regressions (5), (6), (7), (8). All estimations include country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects and countries are observed during the period 2009-2017 (unbalanced sample). 
The unit of observation is country–year. The alpha parameter informs about the degree of dispersion, if alpha is significantly greater than zero the data are over dispersed and are better estimated using 








































Country-fixed effects ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Time-fixed effects ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü 
Obs. 563 563 563 563 588 588 588 588 
Nr. of countries 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
R2 (within)/ Pseudo R2 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
Log pseudolikelihood     -2716.51 -2716.44 -2715.59 -2715.51 
Alpha for overdispersion (std.error) 
 
 
   
 
 (.0628)   
(.0132) 
(.0628)   
 (.0132) 
(.0625)   
 (.0131)  
(0625)   
(.0131) 
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Table B2. Estimation of equation (1) and (2) using an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation. 
  
Note: This table reports results of the estimation of equation (1) and (2) while using an Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation of 
the dependent variable. Differently from the simple logarithmic transformation we used in table 1 and 2, here HIS transformation 
allows us not to loose 33 observations which have a zero value of R&D expenditures of U.S. majority-owned subsidiaries. The 
levels of significance are reported as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are robust to both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation 
using the cluster estimator, clustered at country level. In column (2), all the coefficients on the main variables of interest preserve their 
sign, as well as their significance level, while they result to be higher compared to those reported in column (2) in Table (1), where 
the simple logarithmic transformation is used. In addition, using the HIS, the marginal effect of the statutory corporate income tax 
rate on R&D expenditures also in countries without an IP regime in place becomes marginally significant. It remains positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% significance level in countries with an IP regime in place, although economically higher then the 
one using the logarithmic transformation.  
Dependent Variable: R&D Expenditures of U.S. majority-owned subsidiaries 
Model OLS  
 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) 






















































Gross approach (dummy) * Statutory 
CIT 






Gross approach (dummy) * Tax rate 
on IP income 






























Country-fixed effects ü ü ü ü 
Time-fixed effects ü ü ü ü 
Obs. 621 597 621 597 
Nr. of countries 75 72 75 72 
R2  (within)/ Pseudo R2 0.30 0.36 0.30 0.37 
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Table B3. Controlling for input-related R&D tax incentives. 
 
 
Note: This robustness check controls for the presence of input-related tax incentives per country and year (although in the 
previous estimations, the inclusion of fixed-effects counts for them). We introduce a dummy variable, which equals one if 
country c in year t offers at least one of the four R&D related tax incentives, i.e., tax credits, tax allowance, accelerated 
depreciation and/or super deductions, and 0 otherwise. Qualitative information for the quantitative construction of the Input-
related tax incentives dummy variable is obtained from (i) Ernst and Young Worldwide R&D incentives reference guides, (ii) 
PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries, (iii) OECD R&D Tax Incentives database, (iv) KPMG’s Europe, Middle East & Africa 
region (EMEA) research and development (R&D) incentives guide, as well as (v) national websites. We obtain this 
information for 65 out of 75 countries in our original sample. Controlling for input-related R&D tax incentives does not 
affect our main results, neither the marginal effects as reported in table 1 and 2. On the other hand, R&D input-related tax 
Dependent Variable: R&D Expenditures of U.S. majority-owned subsidiaries 
Model OLS NBM OLS NBM 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) 




























































Gross approach (dummy) * Tax rate on IP 
income 


































































Country-fixed effects ü ü ü ü 
Time-fixed effects ü ü ü ü 
Obs. 531 546 531 546 
Nr. of countries 65 65 65 65 
R2  (within)/ Pseudo R2 0.38 0.30 0.38 0.30 
Log pseudolikelihood  -2627.2036  -2626.3451 
Alpha for overdispersion (std.error)  .0539542   
(.0117088)    
 
 .0537075   
(.0116643)   
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incentives seem to exert no impact on R&D expenditures of U.S. majority-owned subsidiaries, which is somehow in line 
with Knoll et al., (2021), i.e., firms hardly raise their R&D activities due to generous input-related R&D tax incentives. 
However, we are aware of the fact that our dummy variable cancels out the heterogeneity of input-related R&D tax incentives 
across countries, leading us to a very naïve and facile result. 
In table B3, we report results of the estimation of equation (1) in column 1 and 2 and of the estimation of equation (2) in 
columns 3 and 4. The levels of significance are reported as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are robust to both 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation using the cluster estimator, clustered at country level. All estimations include country-
fixed effects and time-fixed effects and countries are observed during the period 2009-2017 (unbalanced sample). The unit 
of observation is country–year. The model is estimated via OLS estimation method in regressions (1) and (3), and via a 
negative binomial model in regressions (2) and (4).The alpha parameter informs about the degree of dispersion, if alpha is 
significantly greater than zero the data are over dispersed and are better estimated using a negative binomial model than a 
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